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Argument
I.

Plaintiff's Complaint States a Claim for Breach of Contract.
In its brief, Defendant Layton City relies on red herrings in an attempt to get

away from the applicable standard of review in this matter. In attempting to argue
that no claim for breach of contract has been pled, Defendant argues that the
word "contract" was never used in the Complaint and that no copy of any written
contract or personnel policy was attached to the Complaint, nor specific language
cited from the policies at issue. (Br. of Appellee at 13-15.)1 However, this
argument disregards the liberal pleading standard established by the Rules of
Civil Procedure and has no support in the Governmental Immunity Act.
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-5(1 )(2003) stated, "Immunity from suit of all
government entities is waived as to any contractual obligation. Actions arising
out of contractual rights or obligations shall not be subject to the requirements of
[this act.]" The Governmental Immunity Act waives the notice requirement for
actions arising out of contractual obligations without setting forth specific pleading
requirements. It does not require specific words in the complaint, nor does it
require citation to contractual language, nor attachment of specific contractual
defendant also asserts that Plaintiff acknowledged in interrogatory
responses that her claims were tort based. (Br. of Appellee at 15.) To the
contrary, the footnote merely argued that even if both tort and contract damages
were sought, the contract damages should still be permitted absent a Notice of
Claim under the Governmental Immunity Act. Moreover, nowhere in Plaintiffs
interrogatory responses from federal court does she suggest that her claims are
based in tort. (Exhibit A, Interrogatory Responses.)

1

provisions. The act simply eliminates the notice requirements when a claim
arises out of contractual rights or obligations.
Absent any indication that the act requires more, the standard pleading
rules under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure apply. Under these rules, a
pleader need only provide "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief." Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1). These rules have been
interpreted "to afford parties 'the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate
contentions they have pertaining to their dispute,' subject only to the requirement
that their adversary have 'fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the
claim and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.'" Williams v. State
Farm Ins. Co.. 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982)(Citations omitted.)
The liberal nature of the pleading rules are further illustrated by the
standard of review employed by the appellate court in reviewing motions to
dismiss under Utah R. Civ. P. 12. In its review, this Court "assume[s] the
allegations to be true" and "liberally construe[s] all reasonable inferences arising
therefrom in determining whether a claim for relief has been stated." Despain v.
Despain. 682 P.2d 849, 850 (Utah 1984). This Court reviews the dismissal
assuming the allegations in the Complaint are true and drawing all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See. Patterson v. American
Fork City. 2003 UT 7, fl9, 67 P.3d 466. Dismissal is only appropriate where "the
plaintiff... would not be entitled to relief under the facts alleged or under any state
2

of facts they could prove to support their claim." Prows v. State. 822 P.2d 764,
766 (Utah 1991). Accordingly, a Complaint must give the opposing party a
"general indication of the type of litigation involved" and allege sufficient facts to
support their claim.
The Complaint filed by Plaintiffs in this matter meets the liberalized
pleading standards of the Rules of Civil Procedure in setting forth a claim for relief
arising from a contractual obligation. Indeed, Plaintiffs Complaint is abundantly
clear in setting forth the nature and basis of the claim for relief. After setting forth
the factual background of Plaintiffs employment and the controversy in 1ffl4-11;
14-15, Plaintiff clearly sets forth that her Complaint sounds in violation of written
city policy. Plaintiff states claims in 1ffl12,13, and 17 that Defendant Layton City's
actions violated its own written policies. These allegations fairly apprised
Defendant of the nature of the claims and have contractual significance under
Utah law, as set forth in Plaintiffs opening brief.
The question which therefore remains is whether these facts as alleged,
when deemed true and viewing all reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff give rise to a contract claim. In Utah, an employer's written

3

personnel policies can create an implied employment contract.2 See, e.g..
Berube v. Fashion Centre. Ltd.. 771 P.2d 1033, 1044 (Utah 1989). Plaintiff's
Complaint expressly alleges constructive termination in violation of written city
policy. If proved, these facts give rise to a contract claim against Defendant
Layton City.
Defendant also suggests that Plaintiff's Complaint is insufficient for failure
to allege facts that would support a determination either that Plaintiff performed
under the contract, or that Defendant breached the contract. This argument rests
on Defendant's contention that Plaintiff freely resigned. However, the allegations
of the Complaint are plainly different. The Complaint alleges performance by
virtue of paragraph 4, which states that Plaintiff worked for Defendant Layton City
in excess of thirteen (13) years. Likewise, Plaintiff's allegation in paragraph 14
that she was forced to resign does not negate her prior performance, but alleges
a breach on the part of the city in the nature of her constructive termination. This,
in addition to several allegations of failure to comply with written city policy, is one
of several allegations establishing breach of the city's contractual obligations.
For these reasons, the district court and Court of Appeals erred in
2

Defendant suggests that this policy is inapplicable in the case at bar
because none of the reported cases from Utah involve public employees.
However, Defendant cites no caselaw that creates such a distinction, nor any
argument as to why such a distinction should be made. Indeed persuasive
authority, such as Garcia v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District. 918 P.2d 7,
11 (N.M. 1996), cited in Plaintiff's initial brief, stands for the proposition that no
such distinction should be made.
4

concluding that the Complaint did not state a cause of action for breach of
contract. Plaintiff having stated a claim for breach of contractual obligations in its
Complaint was not required to comply with the notice provisions of the
Governmental Immunity Act. Therefore, the decisions of the lower courts should
be reversed.

II.

Plaintiff's Employment Rights Were Not Grounded in Statute.
Defendant Layton City argues alternatively that even if the Complaint sets

forth a contract claim, by virtue of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-815, any rights Plaintiff
may have had were statutory, as opposed to contractual. Utah Code Ann. § 103-815 states, "The governing body of each municipality shall prescribe rules and
regulations which are not inconsistent with the laws of this state, as it deems best
for the efficient administration, organization, operation, conduct, and business of
the municipality." It is ironic, given Defendant's urging of this Court to so closely
scrutinize Plaintiffs Complaint for details and particular words, that Defendant
would read so much into a one sentence statute.
Section 10-3-815 makes no reference to employment rights of city
employees. The section contains no language which limits the contractual
significance or effects of a city's actions. It does no more than authorize a city to
establish rules or regulations, where otherwise the statutory authority would not
exist. The statute's language is plain and unambiguous and Defendant cites no
5

caselaw that would give the statute a more expansive interpretation. Moreover,
Plaintiffs research reflects that not so much as one case has ever cited to this
statute since its adoption by the Legislature in 1977.
Defendant appears to be using Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-815 in an effort to
relate this matter to distinguishable Court of Appeals decisions. See. Kniaht v.
Salt Lake County. 2002 UT App 100, 46 P.3d 247; Horn v. Utah Dep't. of Public
Safety. 962 P.2d 95 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). As set forth more fully in Plaintiffs
opening brief these cases differ fundamentally because the statutes at issue in
Kniaht and Horn contain extensive language dealing with employees' rights and
providing for statutory, as opposed to contractual appeals procedures.3
Nevertheless, this caselaw recognizes that an agreement which alters or adds to
the terms and conditions of public employment can create contractual
responsibilities. See. Knight, at fl8.
In this case, the Complaint alleges that the city's written personnel policies
created specific rights, which are not embodied in Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-815,
nor in the Utah Municipal Code. These include regulations related to sick time
benefits (paragraph 12), city regulations related to equal treatment of employees
(paragraph 13), and city regulations related to proportionate punishment and
discipline (paragraph 14). These allegations, accepted as true on review of a

3

See. Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-33-1, et seq.; Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-19a-1, et

seq.
6

Motion to Dismiss, establish alterations or additions to the at-will terms and
conditions of public employment, and in turn contractual rights and
responsibilities. Accordingly, Plaintiffs claim is not statutory, but arises from
contractual obligations, and therefore is not subject to dismissal for failure to
provide a notice of claim.

III.

Plaintiffs Claim Is Not Subject to Dismissal Under the Doctrine of Res
Judicata.
Defendant Layton City cannot properly raise the defense of res judicata at

this stage of the proceedings. This Court has stated, "Review on certiorari is
limited to examining the court of appeals' decision and is further circumscribed by
the issues raised in the petitions." Coulter & Smith. Ltd. v. Russell. 966 P.2d 852,
856 (Utah 1998). Issues raised in the petitions are further limited to those
included in the order granting certiorari. See. DeBry v. Noble. 889 P.2d 428,443
(Utah 1995). Only issues so limited, or those fairly contained in the issues so
identified, are considered on certiorari. See, Coulter & Smith, at 856.
In this case, Plaintiffs Petition Writ for Certiorari identified three questions
for review: (1) whether Plaintiffs claims were subject to the notice provisions of
the Governmental Immunity Act, (2) whether the Court of Appeals erred in
determining that public employees' rights generally spring from statute, not
contract, and (3) whether dismissal with prejudice was proper without allowing

7

Plaintiff the opportunity to amend her Complaint. No further issues were raised in
Defendant's response to the petition, nor was a cross-petition filed.
Subsequently, this Court limited the issues for review to the following: "Whether
petitioner's complaint stated a sufficient claim for the existence of, and violation
of, a contract with the respondent that was not subject to the immunity and notice
of claim provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act." (Exhibit B, Order
granting petition.) Defendant's arguments concerning res judicata are not
encompassed in the issue before this Court on certiorari, nor are they fairly
contained within that issue. The arguments should be accordingly disregarded.
Defendants arguments are further limited by Rule 8. Under Utah R. Civ. P.
8(c), "In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively...
res judicata ..." Under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h), with limited exceptions, "A party
waives all defenses and objections not presented either by motion or by answer
or reply..." If res judicata is not raised in the pleadings, the defense may not be
raised at trial or on appeal. See, e.g.. Merrilees v. Treasurer. State of Vermont.
618A.2d 1314, 1315 (Vt 1992).
In this case, Defendant did not raise the doctrine of res judicata as an
affirmative defense in its Motion to Dismiss. In its motion, Defendant relied solely
on failure to comply with the notice requirements of the Governmental Immunity
Act. Having never raised res judicata before the trial court, Defendant cannot
raise the issue before this Court on appeal. Because the defense of res judicata
8

was not raised in the Motion to Dismiss, nor at any other time in the lower court
proceedings, tins umil should in'I ronsidei ih<:' issue now
In addition, even if the issue of res judicata were properly before this Court,
Plaintiffs action is not barred. Before the doctrine of res judicata applies, there
must be a final judgment i H i ihc inenh. See. Bucknerv. Kennard, i'lNM 111 /»i
1J13, 99 P.3d 842; Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp.. 913 P.2d 731, 733
(Utah 1995). The federal court dismissal of Plaintiffs claim did not result in an
adjudication on the merits. Defendant asserts that the case was < IIMI nssw I with
prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41. However, the very exhibits Defendant cites to
support its defense disproves such an assertion. In their motion and
memorandum to dismiss the complaint in federal court, while Defendant sought
dismissal for failure to comply with a court order, no mention of Rule 41 was ever
made. (See. Br. of Appellee, Exhibit 9.) Likewise, Judge Kimball's order did not
refer to Rule 41, nor was the case dismissed with prejudice, but merely dismissed
without specifics. (See. Br. of Appellee, Exhibit 10.) As such, dismissal of the
case did not result in a final adjudication on the merits, and res judicata does not
apply.

9

IV.

Plaintiff Was Not Required to Exhaust Administrative Remedies.
A.

The Exhaustion Issue Is Not Properly Before This Court on
Certiorari Review.

Like its defense of res judicata, Defendant's defenses regarding failure to
exhaust are not properly before this Court on certiorari. This Court did not grant
certiorari with respect to this issue, it was not raised in the Petition for Cert or
response thereto, and exhaustion of administrative remedies is not fairly
contained within the limited issue before this Court. Accordingly, this Court
should disregard Defendants' arguments on that issue. See. Coulter & Smith, at
856.

B.

Defendant Layton City's Policy Manual Is Not Properly Before
This Court.

Even assuming arguendo that Defendant's exhaustion argument is
properly before this Court, Defendant's argument rests entirely on evidence that
is not properly part of this Court's record. Defendant Layton City argues that
Plaintiff deprived the district court, and concomitantly this Court, of subject matter
jurisdiction by failing to exhaust internal administrative remedies prior to bringing
suit. In support of this assertion, Defendant attached two excerpts appearing to
be from a city personnel policy, and argued that they created an absolute
requirement for Plaintiff to appeal her constructive termination through the city's
appeal procedures. (Br. of Appellee, Ex. 12, 13.) No such evidence was ever

10

presented to the trial court below,

ever properly introduced into the

record in this case.
An appellate court should not consider evidence outside of the record on
appeal. For example, in Chapman v. Chapman, 728 P.2d 121, 122-23 (Utah
1986), thedefendiinls uigcil IIic, I Idih Suprcim• < mill In nvciluin ,i Mimmary
judgment order based on responses to interrogatories and requests for
admission, which were attached to the appellate brief to support the existence of
factual issues. 11 if omul wink', "Mecause these 'riiisweis' <nc CMIISKJC IIIC ICI mil,
we cannot consider them." id- at 123.
In Cooper v. Foresters Underwriters. Inc.. 257 P.2d 540 (Utah 1953), the
Court was referre< I li i n 11 II i ,i< |iie< I stipulation presentee

t

wrote:
The record in this case is extremely brief, and the facts presented therein
so fragmentary and incomplete as to make it impossible for this court to
render a decision without looking dehors the record.-a process we cannot
indulge.... We cannot consider facts stated in the briefs which may be true
but absent in the official record.
These decisions are consistent with other Utah caselaw rejecting consideration of
s outside

See, e.g... Pratt v. Hollow Irrigation Co

1169,1172 (Utah 1991)(Court would not consider facts alleged in appellate brief,
which had no substantiation in the record); Watkins v. Simonds. 385 P.2d 154,
155 (Utah 1963)(Court would not consider facts alleged in appellate brief, where
facts before trial court were stipulated to in chambers without preservation of a
11

record).
In the appeal before the Court, Defendant Layton City has attempted to
circumvent its obligation to present evidence and establish any issues for appeal
through the record. Indeed, it is attempting to create an ad hoc record on appeal,
without basis for doing so. Given the improper inclusion of the policy manual
excerpts in the Appellee's Brief, this Court should give the evidence no
consideration. As such, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that Plaintiff
should have exhausted administrative remedies, and this defense should not be
used to uphold an otherwise improper dismissal of Plaintiffs claims.

C.

Defendant Layton City's Policy Manual Does Not Create an
Exhaustion Requirement.

Even assuming arguendo that the policy manual excerpts provided by
Defendant are properly before this Court, they do not establish exhaustion as a
prerequisite. First, exhaustion of administrative remedies in this case would have
been futile and useless. In Beard v. Baum. 796 P.2d 1344 (Alaska 1990), the
State of Alaska alleged that a constructively discharged employee could not sue
absent exhausting contractual remedies, as is alleged by Defendant Layton City
in the case at bar. The Beard Court found that because the grievance procedure
required the cooperation of the plaintiffs supervisors, a constructively discharged
employee could not be required to exhaust such remedies, as such an attempt

12

would have been futile, id. at 1349. Similarly, in Utah, exhaustion of
inrlmmistrative irmodK's ni>iy he I'»I U..IN1 vvheii il I/I ulil serve nn II ;e!ul | uipusiSee, Nebeker v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 2001 UT 7 4 , f l 4 , 34 P.3d 180.
In this matter, Plaintiffs constructive discharge was the result of coercive
threats by supervisors who would have had extensive influence over
contractual city appellate procedures. Under that policy, the very supervisors
who coerced Plaintiff into resigning bore the responsibility of advising Plaintiff of
her appeal rights. I

of Appellee, Ex. 13.) No evidence suggests Plaintiff's

supervisors so advised her. Furthermore, those same supervisors who forced
Plaintiff into resigning would no doubt exert significant influence over the internal
appellate procedure. Given these facts, requiring Plaintiff to exhaust these local
contractual remedies would be futile, and would serve no useful purpose.
Furthermore, failure to exhaust administrative remedies does not deprive
the courts of subject matter jurisdiction, when resort to the administrative
remedies is not mandatory. In Heinecke v. Dep't. of Commerce. 810 P.2d 459
(Utah Ct. App. 1992), the Respondent claimed that the court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction because of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The
Petitioner did not take an extra review step, which was permitted him, but not
required, under the statute. The Heinecke court concluded that because the
administrative remedy was not mandatory, failure to exhaust did not deprive the
court of subject matter jurisdiction.
13

In the instant case, even though Defendant may have statutory authority to
create rules and regulations, Defendant's rules do not make appeal with city
appellate processes mandatory. Defendant's policy states, "In all cases where an
appointive officer or regular full time employee, other than the City Manager and
heads of departments, is discharged or transferred to a position with less
remuneration for any reason, the officer or regular full-time employee shall have
the right to appeal such discharge or transfer in accordance with this chapter."
(Br. of Appellee, Exh. 13, p.2.)(Emphasis added.) Defendant's policy does not
state that the employee "shall" appeal the discharge, or that the employee "must"
appeal the discharge prior to taking legal action. Instead, Defendant's policy
makes an internal appeal an option, stating the "employee shall have the right to
appeal" the termination. Because use of Defendant's appellate procedure was
not mandatory under their own policies, Defendant cannot now complain that this
Court and the trial court lack subject matter jurisdiction over the case at bar.

Conclusion
As set forth herein, Plaintiffs Complaint sets forth sufficient factual
allegations to sustain a claim for breach of contractual obligations, exempt from
the notice requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act. Plaintiffs claims do
not arise from statute. Furthermore, Defendant Layton City's arguments
regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies and res judicata are not properly

14

before this Court on certiorari. For these reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests
that tins Court inverse Ihe derision nf Hie < imni of Appeals and district court.
DATED this .21 ^

day of March, 2005.
STEVENSON & SMITH

~4&>
K^tt'Vinvu^z
Brad C. Smith
Benjamin C Rasmussen
Attorneys for Machelle Canfield
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Tab A

Brad C. Smith, NO. 6656
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.
3986 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84403
Telephone: (801) 394-4573
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DIVISION, STATE OF UTAH

MACHELLE CANFIELD,
Plaintiff,

:

PLAINTIFF'S ANSWER TO
DEFENDANT'S FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES

vs .
Civil No. 1:02-CV-00041 K
LAYTON CITY, a Utah
municipality,

Judge: Dale A. Kimball

Defendant.
Comes now Plaintiff, by and through counsel, and answers
Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories as follows:
Interrogatory No. 1 : Identify each person whom 5 ou.
anticipate that you will call or may call as a witness at the
time of trial < :>f th :i 3 matter and state the topic or subject
matter upon which each such witnesses will testify, the substance
of the testimony of each witness with respect to each topic or
subject matter, and the identity of all documents which relate to
or concern any such testimony.
Answer to Interrogatory No, 1: Plaintiff has not yet
determined who she will call as witnesses at the time of trial,

when this determination is made, Plaintiff will supplement this
interrogatory.

Plaintiff anticipates that her witnesses may

include: Debbie PettiJohn, Layton Police Dispatch; Laree Hopkins,
Layton Police Dispatch; Debbie Joubert, Layton Police Dispatch;
Blake Haycock, Layton Police Officer; Lt. Quinn Moyes, Layton
Police; and Lisa Murdock, Layton Police Dispatch.

The above

named individuals have knowledge of the circumstances of my
separation with Layton City, my "Garrity" hearing, my use of sick
leave, and my job performance.
Interrogatory No> 2; Identify all documents that you
anticipate presenting to a witness or the trier of the fact at
the trial of this matter, whether as an exhibit or otherwise.
Answer to Interrogatory No. 2: Machelle Canfield's Leave
Time Sheet, Memorandum to Lt. Quinn Moyes from Plaintiff Machelle
Canfield, Certificate to return to work or school from IHC Health
Center. Plaintiff has not yet determined who she will call as
witnesses at the time of trial, when this determination is made,
Plaintiff will supplement this interrogatory.
Interrogatory No, 3: Describe with specificity all damages
Ms. Canfield claims she has suffered as a result of the actions
of the City complained of in her Amended Complaint, and all
information concerning any such damages, including, without
limitation: the precise nature of the damages suffered, the
amount of any such damages, how each damages amount was

2

calculated or estimated, and identify each person involved in
calculating such damages or who otherwise has knowledge of the
basis for and method of calculation for such damages and
summarize each such person's involvement and/or knowledge.
Answer to Interrogatory No, 3:
Past Wages
2 July 2001 - 9 January 2002
unemployed:
at Layton:
17.26/hr. X 40 x (211 days / 7)
= $20,810.63
15 January 2002 - 5 July 2002
IRS
(17.26 - 11.50) x 40 x (171 / 7)
= $5,628.34
Future Wages
5 July 2002 - 2022
(17.26 - 11.50) x 40 x 52 x 20 = $239,616.00
Plaintiff is also entitled to general damages for suffering
and humiliation.

Plaintiff anticipates claiming an amount equal

to front and back pay for general damages.
The following individuals would have knowledge of the basis
for and method of calculation for economic damages as they were
her superiors and they participated in her performance reviews
and have knowledge of her hourly wage, etc.:
Lit. Quinn Moyes # Layton Police Dept., 429 N. Wasatch Dr # Layton
801-546-8300
Chief Terry Keefe, Layton Police Dept., 429 N. Wasatch Dr, Layton
801-546-8300

3

Capt. Dave Nance, Layton Police Dept., 429 N. Wasatch Dr, Layton
801-546-8300
Interrogatory No, 4; Identify any and all documents,
including the financial data of Ms. Canfield and any other data
or information whatsoever used, relied upon, or referred to by
you in evaluation, calculating or estimation the amount of
damages you have suffered as a result of the conduct of the City
complained of in your Amended Complaint, or which otherwise
supports such claim of damages.
Answer to Interrogatory No, 4: W-2 forms, tax returns,
employment evaluations.
Interrogatory No, 5: Have you contacted or interviewed any
persons concerning the facts alleged in your Amended Complaint?
If so, identify each person contacted or interviewed, the
substance of what was said during such contact or interview, when
and where such contact or interview occurred; and identify all
documents evidencing, memorializing or relating to each such
contact or interview.
Answer to Interrogatory No, 5; No
Interrogatory No, 6; Identify each expert witness that you
will call or may call to give opinion testimony at the trial of
this matter, and, for each individual identified, state the
following: Name, address and telephone number of his or her
employer and/or organization(s) with which he or she is
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associated in any professional capacity; the field in which he or
she is offered as an expert or to give opinion testimony; a
summary of his or her qualifications within the field in which he
or she is expected to testify; the substance of the opinions to
which he or she is expected to testify and a summary of the
grounds for each such opinion; all reports and/or publications
rendered by such expert and all documents relating to or
concerning such reports and/or publications of such expert's
opinions; and list and describe each document, photograph or
other tangible thing with respect to which each such expert is
expected to testify.
Answer to Interrogatory No, 6: No experts have presently
been retained.
Interrogatory No. 7: Identify each person or entity for whom
you have performed any work since the termination of your
employment with the City, and, for each person or entity: state
the position you held and the dates and hours worked; describe
all compensation to which you were entitled when performing thatwork, including, but not limited to, salary or other rate of pay,
overtime compensation, car, travel allowance, meal allowance,
health insurance, life insurance, disability, other insurance,
pension or retirement benefits, profit sharing, bonuses, and
commissions; and identify all documents that support to answer to
Interrogatory No. 7.
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Answer to Interrogatory No. 7: Department of Workforce
Services - July 2001 to January 2002 - Unemployment benefits.
Internal Revenue Service - January 2002 to Present.

IRS offers

health insurance, life insurance, disability insurance and
retirement benefits.
Interrogatory No. 8: Since the termination of your
employment with the City, have you been self-employed in any
manner?

If so, state the nature of the work you performed in

your self-employment and the dates or time periods of your selfemployment; the amount you have earned as a result of such selfemployment; and the identity of all documents that support your
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answer to Interrogatory No. 8.
Answer to Interrogatory No. 8: No.
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Interrogatory No. 9: Itemize all income and other
compensation you have received since the termination of your
employment with the City, including in your itemization each date
you received income, the amount, and the source of that income.
Answer to Interrogatory No. 9: See tax records attached in
response to Request for Production of Documents No. 9.
Interrogatory No. 10: Identify each employer, employment
service or agency, or other individual or entity with whom you
have been in contact regarding potential employment since the
termination of your employment with the City, and, for each such
person or entity state the date(s) of each such contact, state

the nature of the employment sought, identify each person you
communicated with, identify all documents that refer or relate to
contact with that person or entity, and describe the outcome of
your contact with that individual or entity.
Answer to Interrogatory No. 10: See response to Request for
Production of Documents No. 13.
Interrogatory No. 11: If you are aware of the existence of
any written or recorded statement made by any party or potential
witness, identify the person making the statement, the date of
the statement, a summary of the contents of the statement, the
name, address, telephone number and occupation of the person or
persons taking the statement, and the name, address and telephone
number of the person now in possession of the original statement.
Answer to Interrogatory No. 11: Plaintiff is aware that her
"Garrity" hearing was partially recorded.
DATED this

day of August, 2002.
Machelle Canfield/J
Plaintiff
Ls

Plaintiff's Address:
3552 W. 5000 S.
Roy, Utah 84067
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STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF WEBER

:ss.
)

?\

On the -h day of ^ ^ I s t ^ 2002, at Ogden, Utah, personally
appeared before me Machelle Canfield, the signer of the within
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that she executed the
same.
Notary Public

JULIE S.WILLIAMS

til mm /;/
, ^Naiv'

863 25TH STREET
OGDEN, UTG4414
My Commission Expires
JUNS 88,200*
SfATiGf UTAH

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at Ogden, Utah

My Commission Expires
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
Machelle Canfield,
Petitioner,
v.

Case No. 20040681-SC

Layton City, a Utah Municipality,
Respondent.

ORDER
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, filed on August 12, 2004.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 4 5 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is
granted only as to the following issue:
Whether petitioner's complaint stated a sufficient claim for
the existence of, and violation of, a contract with the
respondent that was not subject to the immunity and notice of
claim provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
FOR THE COURT:

Date

Christine M. Durham
Chief Justice

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on October 20, 2004, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States
mail to the party(ies) listed below:
BRAD C. SMITH
BENJAMIN C. RASMUSSEN
STEVENSON & SMITH PC
3986 WASHINGTON BLVD
OGDEN UT 84403
STANLEY J. PRESTON
CAMILLE N. JOHNSON
MARALYN M REGER
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 EXCHANGE PL 11TH FLOOR
PO BOX 45000
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84145-5000
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited
in the United States mail to the trial court listed below:
SECOND DISTRICT, FARMINGTON
ATTN: LINDA WOODWARD
PO BOX 769
800 W STATE ST
FARMINGTON UT 84025

Deputy Clerk
Case No. 20040681-SC
SECOND DISTRICT, FARMINGTON, 020700620

